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Applications of the Public Trust Doctrine to the
Protection and Preservation of Wetlands: Can It
Fill the Statutory Gaps?
I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Background
It has only been. in relatively recent times that western
society has deemed it necessary to protect the environment
from development and abuse. 1 But even so, our nation has
been ambivalent toward environmental protection, wavering
between calls for development, justified by economic need, and
concern for what appears to be an environmental catastrophe
in the making. 2 Wetlands3 have not avoided this dilema. By
1976, perhaps as much as forty percent of the wetlands in the
United States had been destroyed. 4
In 1954, the first effort to inventory the nation's wetlands
began. 5 The next such effort, the National Wetlands Inventory
Project, commenced in 1974 and was much broader in purpose,

1.
According to Roderick Nash, development of the wilderness, especially in
the United States, was largely considered a necessary step to physical and economic security. A change in attitude toward nature and wilderness began to appear,
beginning with the writings of Henry David Thoreau, in the latter part of the
nineteenth century. It was not until the 1960s, however, that large scale public
support began to appear for preservation of the environment. RODERICK NASH,
WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (3rd ed. 1982).
2.
ld.
3.
The Army Corps of Engineers, The EPA, The Fish and Wildlife Service, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service and other interested
federal agencies have long been operating under different definitions of wetlands.
In 1989, the FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL
WETLANDS (Delineation Manual) was published. This standardized the definition of
wetlands among the various federal agencies involved. According to the Delineation
Manual, wetlands have three basic characteristics: "hydrophobic vegetation, hydric
soils, and wetland hydrology." ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, E.P.A., F.W.S. AND
U.S.D.A. SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE, THE FEDERAL ANNUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND
DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS, Part II 2.0 (1989).
4.
Joan M. Ferretti, Restoring the Nations Wetlands: Can the Clean Water
Act's Dredge and Fill Guidelines Do the Job?, 1 PACE ENV. 1. REV. 105, 106
(1983).
5.
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, CLASSIFICATION OF
WETLANDS AND DEEPWATER HABITAT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2 (1979).
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providing comprehensive data on the characteristics and extent
of the nation's wetlands for the first time. 6 Since completion of
the inventory project in 1979, no major studies have comprehensively reconsidered the inventory. 7 It was not until the
passage of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 19728 that the federal government took affirmative steps to actually protect the ecological integrity of
wetlands for wetlands' sake. 9
Wetlands protection came to the forefront of public attention as the scientific community gathered more information
about the importance of wetlands. Wetlands serve a variety of
ecological functions, among them: "[W]etlands regulate water
flows, storing water and buffering the effects of storms. They
filter and help to purify water, and they provide essential habitat for flora and fauna." 10 Wetlands also act as a nursery for a
great deal of wildlife.U Between sixty and ninety percent of
the coastal fisheries depend on wetlands as spawning grounds;
the fur and hide industries also depend on wetlands for their
vitality, as do sport fishermen and birdwatchers. 12 Further,
over thirty percent of the Nation's endangered species depend
on wetlands for their survival. 13 It also appears that wetlands
help to stabilize local weather by moderating local temperature
and precipitation. 14

Id.
7.
Bill 0. Wilen & Warren E. Frayer, Status and Trends of U.S. Wetlands and
Deepwater Habitats, 33/34 FOREST ECOLOGY AND MGMT., 181, 182 (1990).
8.
33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1989).
9.
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 granted regulatory jurisdiction over
"Navigable waters of the United States" to the Army Corps of Engineers. 33 U.S.C.
§ 403. If a wetland fulfills the statutes definition of navigable, it is deemed to fall
under the jurisdiction of the Army Corps of Engineers. Navigability under this
statute has been defined as, 1) navigability in fact, 2) connection with other waterways making such waters usable as highways of interstate commerce. Minnehaha
Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617, 622-623 (8th Cir. 1979); see also
The Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall) 557, 563 (1871).
Thus, the Army Corps of Engineers has had jurisdiction over wetlands for some
time, but § 404 of the Clean Water Act is the first statute which has protected
wetlands for their own sake rather than for purposes of navigation or waterfowl
preservation.
10.
Wilen, supra note 7, at 182.
11.
Id.
12.
Id. at 183.
Id.
13.
14.
ld.; see also FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note 5, at 39. This report
also makes special note of the intrinsic values of wetlands.
For many personal reasons, whether ethical, religious, aesthetic or recre6.
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Inadequacies of Section 404

The fill and dredge permit system of section 404 15 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Aces has slowed but not
stopped the loss of wetlands. In 1981 the conversion of coastal
wetlands was reduced by only seventy to eighty-five percentY
Even greater losses continue for inland wetlands. 18 In part,
these continued losses result from enforcement problems under
the present protection scheme, but most losses result from activities that do not fall under the jurisdiction of section 404 or
most state statutes. "Agricultural conversions involving drainage, clearing, land leveling, ground water pumping, and surface
water diversion were responsible for eighty percent [of
wetlands] conversions." 19 In the twenty year period from the
mid-1950's to the mid-1970's, 11,000,000 acres of wetlands
were so converted, 20 and the present system established by
section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act does not
provide a means to stop it.
The present administration has declared a policy of "no net
loss" of America's wetlands. 21 Unless they make considerable
changes in the means by which we protect wetlands, the present system will allow for their continued conversion.

ational in nature, people value wetlands for their intrinsic qualities. Because these intrinsic values are intangible and thus difficult to express in
quantitative and economic terms, they are often overlooked in a society
where decisions are based on numerical cost-benefit analyses.
[d.
15.
See infra text accompanying note 28.
16.
33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1989).
17.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, WETLANDS: THEIR
USE AND REGULATION, 141 (1984).
18.
ld. at 7.
19.
ld.
20.
ld. at 87.
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS AD21.
MINISTRATION, PuBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, GEORGE
BUSH, 1989, BooK II (1990). The official press release read:

The President has called for a national goal of "no net loss" of wetlands.
Consistent with that pledge, an interagency task force has been convened
and is meeting to develop recommendations to meet that goal. The president has proposed special legislative authority to allow interest from monies collected under the Pullman-Robinson Act to be used for wetland purchase under the North American Waterfowl Management Act.
ld. It is still unclear what the Bush administration meant by "no net loss", and
aside from the purchase proposal, it is still unclear what other steps the administration had in mind to initiate the policy.
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The Public Trust Doctrine Can Fill the Gap.

The public trust doctrine traditionally protected the states'
interest in keeping large public waterways free for navigation
and public use. 22 Since then, the doctrine has been greatly
expanded to allow for the protection of a variety of different
interests in waters that would otherwise not be considered
navigable in the formal sense. 23
The public trust doctrine can be applied to protect
wetlands from the removal of their vital water, a major means
of their destruction, regardless of their navigability. It may
also place a responsibility on the states to take other affirmative actions to protect wetlands. Thus the public trust doctrine
fills a vital gap in the protection of wetlands which the present
federal and state protection schemes have left unprotected.
II. PROTECTION OF WETLANDS UNDER SECTION 404 OF THE
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AcT

In 1972, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments expressly intending, "to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters."24 The Federal Water Pollution Control
Ace5 makes it unlawful to "discharge . . . any pollutant" into the navigable waters of the United States. 26 For the purposes of this Act, the definition of navigable waters is broad,
and has been interpreted by the EPA to include a variety of
bodies of wate~ 7 that would not be considered navigable un-

22.
Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law:
Discord or Harmony, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. !NST., 17-1, 17-24 (1984).
23.
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts
on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L., 425, 465 (1989).
24.
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1989).
25.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1386 (1989).
26.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1989).
27.
"Waters of the United States" are defined by the EPA as,
(a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide;
(b) All interstate waters, including interstate "wetlands;"
(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, "wetlands," sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which would
affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce . . . .
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1991). Thus, if a given body of water fits the definition of a
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der the traditional definition. 28 Pollutants are defined by the
Act to include: "[D]redged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, . . . rock, sand, [and] cellar dirt . . . .
"29 This definition is sufficiently broad to make it illegal to
discharge almost anything into a wetland.
Section 404 of the Act establishes a permitting system for
the legal discharge of dredge or fill material into navigable waters. However, it was specifically intended to prevent the
dumping of fill into the Nation's wetlands. 30 Section 404 delegates power to issue such permits to the Army Corps of Engineers.31 The EPA also has veto power over dredge and fill
permits under certain circumstances. 32
Before a permit can be issued under section 404, the Army
Corps of Engineers, or a designated state permitting authority,33 must conclude that the permittee will comply with four
limiting guidelines. First, there must be no practicable alternative; second, there must be no significant adverse impacts;
third, all reasonable mitigation must be employed; and fourth,
no other statutory violations may occur. 34
As this very abbreviated overview of section 404 shows, the
federal scheme for protecting wetlands concerns itself primarily
with what goes into wetlands, not with what is taken out. 35
Section 404 excludes application of the permitting requirement
for "normal farming operations, silviculture and ranching activities such as plowing, seeding, cultivating, [and] minor
drainage . . . ."36 Thus, the major source of wetlands conver-

wetland, it will be subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
28.
The Daniel Ball v. United States, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). Here,
the Court defined navigable waters as "navigable in fact. And they are navigable
in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade."
29.
33 u.s.c. § 1362(6) (1989).
30.
33 u.s.c. § 1344 (1989).
31.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (1989).
32.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1989). The Administrator may "prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal of specification) of any . . . disposal site," and may
do so "whenever he determines . . . that the discharge of such materials into such
area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish
beds and fishery areas . . . wildlife, or recreational areas."
33.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(h) (1989).
Ferretti, supra note 4, at 109 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 230.10 (a)-(d) (1990)).
34.
35.
ld. at 108.
36.
33 U.S.C. § 1344(0(1)(A) (1989).
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sion, agriculture, 37 is largely exempt from the limitations of
the Act.
As mentioned above, a variety of other activities which
may destroy or adversely affect wetlands do not fall under the
Act's jurisdiction. 38 Among these are excavation, clearing,
drainage and water allocation, either upstream or ground water, none of which constitute fills for the purpose of section
404. 39 "These activities were responsible for the vast majority
of past conversions, especially in inland areas, where 95% of
the Nation's wetlands are located. Inland freshwater wetlands
are generally poorly protected.'>4°
Of particular concern is the impact of water allocation on
wetlands. Water is of course the key element of any wetland
area:
The effects of [water] withdrawals and diversions on downstream wetlands are twofold. First, upstream depletions may
lower the water table in downstream freshwater wetlands,
causing a temporary or permanent loss of vegetation and a
decrease in habitat values. Second, decreasing freshwater
inflow in coastal areas will allow tidal incursion of saltwater
into the brackish and freshwater marshes. The increase in
salinity to these marshes will reduce species diversity and
abundance as well as overall ecosystem productivity. 41

The effectiveness of federal efforts to protect the water
resources necessary for wetlands preservation is inhibited by
the nature of water law. The power to allocate water has been
left primarily to the respective states. 42 Although it is clear
from case law that the states do not own the water, their control of its distribution is almost complete. 43

37.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 17 at 7.
38.
See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 16, at 4.
39.
Id.
40.
41.
Id. at 123.
FRANK J. TRELEASE & GEORGE A. GoULD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER
42.
LAW 692 (4th ed. 1986) (citing Frank J. Trelease, Reclamation Water Rights, 32
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 464, 465 (1960).
43.
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). Though this case was primarily
concerned with the restriction placed on the export of water by the state of Nebraska, the Court addressed the nature of the state's interest in its unappropriated
waters. The Court explicitly rejected Nebraska's claim that the state was the owner of its waters. The Court analogized the state's interest in water to its interest
in wildlife, which was expressly held to not be an ownership interest: "[t]his court
traced the demise of the public ownership theory and defmitely recast it as 'but a
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Any system that is going to adequately protect wetlands
must address the problem of what is being taken out of
wetlands, not just what is being put into them. The public
trust doctrine can step in to fill this gap in the federal wetlands
protection system. The public trust doctrine has not only
evolved in such a manner that a state may use it to protect
water resources, but it may well be applied to protect the various values associated with wetland ecosystems.
Ill.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

A. History of the Doctrine
It is actually very difficult to say what the public trust
doctrine "is." In fact, to call it a doctrine is probably not completely accurate. 44 In reality it is fifty-one separate doctrines
that vary from state to state and from the state to federal systems.45 Each version of the public trust doctrine, however,
does require that certain public interests in state waters, or
interests connected with those waters, be given special protection by the courts. What is protected, and to what extent it is
protected, depends on the jurisdiction in question.
The public trust has its roots in Roman law. As long ago
as the Institutes of Justinian, running waters, "were res communes - things common to all and property of none."46 Use of
rivers, the sea and its shores were free for all. 47 This concept
spread among the various civil law countries, finding its way
into the Napoleonic Code and Spanish law. 48

fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State
have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource.'" !d.
at 951.
A state manages the water within its jurisdiction, but cannot be said to own it.
44.
Laura H. Kosloff, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi: Is the Public Trust
Becoming Synonymous with the Public Interest?, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10200, 10201
(1988).
45.
Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 425 n. 1.
46.
United State v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 744 (1950).
47.
"The Institutes of Justinian summarize the Roman law public trust: 'Things
common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, running water, the sea, and
consequently the shores of the sea.'" McCurdy, Public Trust Protection for Wetlands,
19 ENVTL. L., 683, 685, n.ll (1989), (quoting J. Inst. 2.1.1).
Gerlach, 339 U.S. at 944-945; see also Dunning, supra note 21, at 17-6 n.10
48.
(1984)(quoting Las Siete Partidas 3.28.6 (Scott trans. & ed. 1932)). Spanish law
provided, "Every man has a right to use the rivers for commerce and fisheries, to
tie up to the banks, and to land cargo and fish on them."
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American public trust concepts arise directly from those
developed under the English common law which stated thatjus
publicum was held in trust for the people by the Crown. Most
notable among these protected interests were the coasts and
rivers affected by the tide. 49 The English public trust doctrine
primarily prohibited the Crown from alienating such waters
and lands. 50
B.

Development of the Public Trust in the United States

As successors to the King of England, the original thirteen
colonies incorporated the English common law concept of the
public trust into American law. 51 The people of each state
were considered to hold all navigable waters and the land underlying them in common. 52 Navigable waters in territories of
the United States which had not yet been granted statehood
were held in trust by the federal govemment. 53 Upon admission to the Union, title to the navigable waters within the new
state and the land underlying them passed to the state under
what is called the equal footing doctrine. 54

49.
See supra note 23, at 431.
50.
Dunning, supra note 22, at 17-5 note 9.
The right to alienate public rights, E.G., of fishery, was taken from the Crown by
Magna Charta. [Cite ommited] An illustrative case is Malcomson v. O'Day, 11 Eng.
Rep. 1155, 1156 X H.L.C. 593 (H.L. 1862):
The soil of navigable tidal rivers, so far as the tide flows and reflows, is
prima facia in the Crown, and the right of fishery therein is prima facie
in the public. But the right to exclude the public therefrom . . . existed
in the crown, and might, lawfully, have been exercised by the Crown
before Magna Charta.
!d.
51.
Kosloff, supra note 44, at 10201.
52.
Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S.(16 Pet.) 367, 412-13 (1842).
53.
Borax Consol. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1935). Cited by
McCurdy, supra note 47.
In Pollard's Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845), the Su54.
preme Court announced the equal footing doctrine, with the intention that the new
states receive all the powers of soveriegnity enjoyed by the original states. Since
the navigable waters and their beds were held in trust by the original states, all
subsequent states acquired such sovereign control. This doctrine did not, however,
grant title to the state of other federally owned lands. See also Illinois Central
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Some states have subsequently attempted to extend the equal footing doctrine to
all lands owned by the federal government within the state. This view has been
expressly rejected by the courts, that continue to limit the doctrine's application to
navigable waters and their beds. Nevada ex rel. Nevada State Board of Agriculture
v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166 (D.Nev. 1981), affd, 699 F.2d 486 (9th Cir.
1983).
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Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois 55 is the seminal
case on the public trust doctrine and its early development in
the United States. Illinois Central made it clear that the
states held actual title to navigable waters, and that the sovereign control of those waters were limited by the parameters of
the trust. 56
According to the facts of Illinois Central, the Illinois legislature granted a considerable amount of Chicago's waterfront
to the Illinois Central Railroad, along with the submerged
lands under Chicago's harbor. 57 Because of the dubious circumstances under which the grant was made, the legislature
rescinded the grant. 58 The State of Illinois sought a decree confirming its title to the bed of Lake Michigan. 59
The Court accepted outright that the state of Illinois held
title to the navigable waters and the land underlying them,
thus giving it power, at least hypothetically, to grant away its
interest. 60 However, the Court made it clear that title was
held in trust for the public and that the state could dispose of
such lands only if such disposition did not conflict with the
public interest in them. 61 The Court held the legislature's
recission of the transfer to be valid in light of the State's duties
under the public trust doctrine. 62
Even in light of relatively clear acceptance of the public
trust doctrine, it is not entirely clear whether the doctrine is
grounded in state or federal law. The public trust doctrine is

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

146 U.S. 387 (1892).
ld. at 453.
ld. at 340 n.l.
ld. at 410-11.
ld. at 412.
The Illinois Central Court stated:
It is settled law of this country that the ownership of and dominion and
soveriegnity over lands covered by tide waters, within the limits of the
several States, belong to the respective States within which they are
found, with the consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof,
when that can be done without substantial impairment of the interest of
the public in the waters . . . . This doctrine has been often announced by
this court, and is not questioned by counsel of any of the parties.
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892)(citing Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S.(3 How.) 212 (1845)).
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453 (holding that the control of the State for
61.
the purpose of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used
in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and water remaining).
62.
ld. at 464.
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commonly perceived as a state law concept, 63 but the early
cases on the subject refer to it as a federal law doctrine. 64
The legal foundation of the public trust is also not particularly clear. Four possible sources have been forwarded by commentators:65 first, some claim the doctrine arises from federal
common law; second, some have forwarded the theory that the
doctrine arises from the Guarantee Clause, a view which can
be implied from the language of Illinois Central; third, Congressional preemption is seen as a likely source of the doctrine;
and finally, and probably the most convincing alternative, some
claim that the doctrine arises from the Commerce Clause itself.66
Regardless of the doctrine's legal foundation, it is clear
that power to administer and define the outward reach of the
trust lies with the states, though the state's power to decrease
the impact of the trust may be limited. 67 An alternative way
of expressing this: federal law determines the minimum reach
of the public trust, and state law determines the outward expansion of the trust.
What makes the public trust potentially useful in the protection of wetlands is that states have been willing to expand
the trust beyond its original purpose of protecting public use of
navigable waters. In fact, the trust has been expanded to protect a variety of public interests. 68

63.
McCurdy, supra note 47.
64.
Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 453. "Illinois Central, however, seems plainly
to have been premised on federal law. The briefs relied upon both federal cases
and authority from many different states, of which Illinois was just one."
65.
!d. at 455.
66.
!d. at 453-59.
67.
!d. at 461. According to Wilkinson:
There are powerful state interests - powerful enough to induce the implied transfer in the first place - and strong national interests - strong
enough to impress an implicit trust on these highly valued natural resources. It does not make sense that a state could abdicate a federally
and constitutionally imposed trust completely.
!d.
See infra note 92.
68.
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APPLICATION OF THE PuBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO
WETLANDS PROTECTION

A. Extension of the Trust
The public trust doctrine has expanded considerably over
the years, protecting interests beyond navigability. The trust's
scope varies greatly from state to state, protecting interests
ranging from stream access69 to clean drinking water. 70 The
trust's scope depends in great part on a liberal definition of
navigability. There are at least three definitions of navigability,71 each serving a different purpose: navigability for determining federal jurisdiction, 72 navigability under the equal footing doctrine, 73 and navigability under a prong of the public
trust doctrine known as the public use doctrine. 74

1. Expanding the Definition of Navigability.
The definition of navigability for the purposes of general
federal jurisdiction was expanded from the ebb and flow definition of English Common Law to a navigability in fact test. 75
This test was in turn expanded to include waters that could be

69.
Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont.
1984).
Mayor of the City of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n., 539 A.2d
70.
760, 765 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
71.
Kosloff, supra note 44, at 10205. It should be noted that the jurisdiction of
section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act is dependent on a different,
very liberal, definition of navigability.
72.
33 u.s.c. § 403 (1989).
73.
Pollard's Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S.(3 How.) 212, 223 (1845).
74.
See Ralph W. Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake
Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 248-49 (1980). The terminology "public use doctrine" may be loosely associated with jus publicum. However, the courts have been
very loose in the use of this language, making it hard to tell when they are talking about the public trust or public use, or if they perceive the doctrines as being
different at all. See id. at 248-49 n.63.
The public use doctrine is so closely allied and so parallel to the public
trust doctrine in its protection of in-place water uses that it can justifiably be claimed as a part, or a different form of expression, of the public
trust doctrine. Courts have used the public use doctrine, developed largely
since the Second World War, to protect the public right of navigation on
waters that are recreationally but not commercially navigable, where the
beds are generally privately owned.
ld.
75.
Dunning, supra note 22, at 17-18.
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made navigable with reasonable improvements. 76
Navigability under the equal footing doctrine is more narrowly defined than it is for federal jurisdiction. Here the definition is also navigability in fact, but it is limited to the ordinary condition of the water before improvement. 77
The definition of navigability under the public use doctrine
is the most expansive of these definitions. In fact, some have
questioned whether any kind of navigability is a prerequisite to
the application of this doctrine at all. 78 In reality, the definition varies from state to state, but most often it is based on
some historical use of the water for recreational or general
public use. 79
Some have forwarded the view that the public trust doctrine and the public use doctrine are in fact two different legal
concepts. However, the public use and the public trust arise
from the identical concept of state ownership of navigable waters, and it is perhaps most logical to view the public use doctrine as being a subset of the public trust. 80

2.

What the Public Trust Protects.

Of the three definitions of navigability, only the one applicable to the concept of public use is broad enough to protect
wetlands to any extent. 81 Expressing any specific rules on
what the public use doctrine protects is as difficult as making
general statements about the public trust, because it is in fact

76.
United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 408 (1940).
77.
Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
78.
Kosloff, supra note 44, at 10208.
79.
Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893) (The public trust protects
sailing, rowing, fowling, bathing, skating and domestic, agricultural and city water
needs.).
Johnson, supra note 74, at 252. As is the case with the public trust gen80.
erally, the source of the state's power under the public use doctrine is not at all
clear. Courts have articulated three broad justifications for their exercise of the
trust power over the waters of the state. First, some have held a public use of
waters for recreational boating, fishing etc, to be a public riparian right. Second,
some courts have based the doctrine on the Northwest Ordinance and to state
constitutions which guarantee navigation of the Missouri and Mississippi rivers,
including their tributaries. Third, some courts have based the doctrine on state
constitutional language which declares waters of the state as being the domain of
the citizens of the state. ld. at 250-51.
81.
Because most wetlands involve amounts of water insufficient to make them
"navigable in fact," common law definitions are unable to protect them. Section 404
operates under a much broader definition of navigability which gives it jurisdiction
over wetlands regardless of "navigability in fact." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1989).
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fifty different doctrines. 82 Most states, however, use the public use doctrine to protect some sort of activity or use of public
waters. 83
Some commentators have argued that navigability for the
purposes of the public trust is no longer a concern. 84 In fact,
several courts have protected certain interests regardless of
whether definitions of navigability were met. 85 That the definition of navigability is no longer relevant at all is probably an
overstatement. The definition of navigability may or may not
be a factor depending on the jurisdiction and the interests
being addressed. 86

B.

How the Public Trust Can Protect Wetlands

The public trust doctrine applies wetlands protection in
two ways: protection of the wetland's water interests, and protection of wetlands for their uses.

82.
Kosloff, supra note 44, at 10206.
83.
National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 777 (1983) (appropriative water rights are subject to the public
trust); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (public trust doctrine protects
food and habitat for fish and wildlife); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215
N.E.2d 114 (Mass. 1966) (trust requires strict judicial review when state parklands
are leased for private use); Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893) (public
trust protects sailing, rowing, fowling, bathing, skating and domestic, agricultural
and city water needs); Jerke v. State Dep't of Lands, 597 P.2d 49 (Mont. 1979)
(public trust demands that full market value be paid when public lands are
leased); Mayor of Clifton v. Passaic Valley Water Comm'n, 539 A.2d 760 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (drinking water is protected by the public trust);
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 821 (1984) (public access to dry sand beaches protected by public trust);
United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247
N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976) (broad duty to protect the people's water interests in considering large scale water allocations).
Johnson, supra note 73 at 250, n.66: "Professor Corker argued persuasively
84.
as long ago as 1970 that the whole concept of navigability for determining anything other than the floating of a supreme court opinion should be abandoned. The
concept is confusing, slippery, unpredictable, antique and irrelevant to today's problems." See also Kosloff, supra note 44, at 10206.
85.
People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897) (enjoined a mill from
polluting the Truckee river because it was killing the fish, even though the river
passed through private land); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran,
682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984) (recreational use of river for fishing in itself made
stream navigable); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) (swamps
and wetlands necessary part of the ecology and were connected with navigable
waterways).
86.
Mark v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (action to quiet title in tidelands).
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1. Protection of Wetland Water Interests.
As was discussed earlier, the loss of wetlands through
appropriation and diversion of water resources is significant. 87
It is possible that a state might assert the public trust doctrine
to halt allocation of water to protect wetlands within the state.
The state has a strong proprietary interest in the allocation of the water resources within its borders. 88 On several
occasions, this interest has been deemed significant enough to
justify application of the trust to water allocations.
In United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water
Conservation Commission, 89 the North Dakota Supreme Court
stated that the public trust doctrine requires that the state
consider both short and long term impacts on trust interests
before large appropriations of water can be made. 90 "Confined
to traditional concepts, the Doctrine confirms the State's role as
trustee of the public waters. It permits alienation and allocation of such precious state resources only after an analysis of
the present supply and future need."91
United Plainsmen is noteworthy. Although the North Dakota Supreme Court did not directly address the issue of navigability, it implied that the state's duty under the trust extended beyond navigability to the resource itself. 92 This rule
would potentially extend the trust to allocations of ground
water as well as to surface waters. A broad reading of the
case, and similar holdings by other courts, would also extend
the trust to other natural resources within the state over which
the state holds a proprietary interest, such as minerals, wildlife
and timber. 93
United Plainsmen can possibly be applied to protect
wetlands in two ways. First, it could require protection of

87.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 7.
88.
See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
89.
247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
ld. at 464.
90.
91.
ld.
92.
The court in this case also relied upon statutory and constitutional language to find authority for the trust. !d. at 461.
93.
People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897), is another example of
the extension of the trust to other natural resource interests, in this case, the
protection of fish. Because the fish fell under the protection of the trust, the waters upon which they were dependent were also subject to the protection of the
trust.
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wetlands under the auspices of the trust duty over state waters. Because wetlands rejuvenate aquifers, control runoff and
purify water, the quality and quantity of both ground and surface water directly depends in many situations on the well
being of wetlands. 94 From this connection with a protected
state water source, an affirmative duty may be implied under
the trust to consider the short and long term impact on
wetlands before any destructive activity is undertaken. Such
an approach is particularly appealing because of its independence from any finding of navigability, thus protecting
wetlands that cannot qualify as navigable. 95
Second, many other important state natural resources
protected by the public trust, particularly wildlife, may be dependent on wetlands for their continuing vitality. Because of
this, the wetlands may also qualify for protection under the
trust if such a vital connection exists. 96
Trust protection based on a connection with some other
protected state resource does have weaknesses. Foremost
among these are: 1) it depends on state interpretation of the
trust, which may be limited depending on the jurisdiction, 2) it
only imputes a duty to consider trust concerns - limited
wetland impacts might not justify intervention by the courts if
the legislature has already considered such impact, and 3) it
requires the court to base protection on some connection to a
protected waterway, which may or may not be sufficiently verifiable.
Wetlands that can qualify as navigable under the applicable state definition may be directly protected from deprivation
of their water resources. National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court of Alpine County, 97 is perhaps the best example of the
judicial restriction of water allocations to protect trust interests
in a navigable body of water. In that case, the California Supreme Court ordered reconsideration of the allocation of two
streams used by the City of Los Angeles since 1970. 98 As a
result of these allocations, the level of Mono Lake, a saline
body of water near the Sierra Nevada Mountains, dropped to

94.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 17, at 47-51.
95.
United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n.,
247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976)
96.
People v, Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897).
97.
658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
ld. at 732-33.
98.
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levels that endangered the "scenic beauty and ecological values" of the lake. 99
Mter first determining Mono Lake to be a navigable body
of water/ 00 the court announced, "that the public trust doctrine . . . protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of nonnavigable tributaries." 101
Along with extending the trust beyond the shores of the
navigable body to limit appropriations from tributary waters,
the court held that water rights appropriated prior to any negative impact on the protected water body were not absolute, but
were subject to, "a duty of continuing supervision over the
taking and use of the appropriated water." 102 The court also
said, "The state accordingly has the power to reconsider allocation decisions even though those decisions were made after
due consideration of their effect on the public trust." 103 In
light of the fact that the appropriations in this case were granted in 1940, 104 and the case finally decided in 1983, the reach
of the public trust in California is long indeed.
What impact could this ruling have on the protection of
wetlands? First, it could bar water allocations that could damage navigable wetlands, be they surface or groundwater allocations. Second, taken to its logical extreme, this expression of
the public trust doctrine could allow the state to reconsider and
revoke water rights to allow for the reclamation of once navigable wetlands. This could be an incredibly potent weapon,
though dangerous to use in light of the policy and political
ramifications involved in revoking long relied upon water
rights.
The use of the public trust doctrine to protect wetland
water interests does have inherent limitations. First, because
99.
!d. at 711.
100.
ld. at 719. California operates the trust under a liberal definition of navigability. "A waterway usable only for pleasure boating is nevertheless a navigable
waterway and protected by the public trust." !d. at 720, n.l7.
Such a definition could well apply to relatively shallow wetlands, where flat boats
have been used in waterfowl hunting or fishing etc., potentially impacting a broad
number of wetlands. Board of Univ. School Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271 (8th
Cir. 1982), is another example of such a liberal definition of navigability which
could potentially reach wetlands (use of small recreational boats and floating logs).
See also Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont.
1984), extends the trust to all waters usable for recreational purposes.
Audubon, 658 P.2d at 721 (citations ommited).
101.
!d. at 728.
102.
103.
ld.
104.
ld. at 711.
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the parameters of the trust are defined by state law, 105 not
all jurisdictions will allow it to reach so far as to revoke existing water rights or impact allocations from tributary streams
flowing into the navigable body. 106 No general rule can be
stated, and the reach of the rule will depend on the jurisdiction.
Second, the application of the public trust in this form still
depends on a definition of navigability, liberal though it may
be. Under the current definition of wetlands/ 07 a large number of wetlands areas would not be protected from water allocation for want of navigability or connection to a protected body
of water. 108

2.

Protection of Wetlands for Public Uses.

Certain states have been willing to extend the public trust
beyond the protection of water and resources to protect uses
traditionally carried out on the public trust waters. These
courts have not restricted themselves to definitions of navigability in many instances, and in some cases have held that the
trust protects those activities even when the land underlying
the waterways is owned by a private party. 109
Uses receiving protection under the public trust doctrine
fall primarily under two categories: recreational and wildlife
habitat.
Recreational uses protected by the trust have included
boating, swimming, bathing, hunting and skating. 110 Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran 111 is an example
of how the public trust may be applied to create a recreational
trust. This case concerned the right of the public to access the
Dearborn River as it passed through the property of the defen-

105.
Wilkinson, supra note 23, at 464 n.164.
106.
Dunning, supra note 22, at 17-45. "The future in Western states other than
California is much less clear. United Plamsmen from North Dakota and Kootenai
Environmental Alliance from Idaho may be read as effectively being as broad as
Audubon, or they may be narrowly confined." ld.
107.
ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, supra note 3.
108.
United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
109.
Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
110.
Lamprey v. Metcalf, 53 N.W. 1139 (Minn. 1893) (public trust protects
sailing, rowing, fowling, bathing, & skating). But see Idaho Forest Indus. v. Hayden
Lake Watershed Improvement district, 733 P.2d 733 (Idaho 1987), McCurdy, Public
Trust Protection for Wetlands, 19 ENVTL. L. 682 (1989).
111.
682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1984).
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dant, who also claimed title to the banks and the bed of the
river where it passed through his property. The court held
that the river in question, though not navigable in fact, was
navigable under the more liberal state definition of navigability112 and, thus, protected by the public trust.
The court considered more than navigability while considering the protection of recreational interests. The court held
that past recreational use of a stream made it navigable m
fact. The court stated:
The capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes
determines their availability for recreational use by the public. Streambed ownership by a private party is irrelevant. If
the waters are owned by the State, and held in trust for the
people of the State, no private party may bar the use of those
waters by the people. The Constitution and the public trust
doctrine do not permit a private party to interfere with the
public's right to recreational use of the surface of the State's
waters. 113

This embodiment of the public trust could be applied to the
protection of wetlands. If it could be shown that such wetlands
are or have been used for recreational purposes, then public
use of those waters could not be denied on the basis of private
ownership.
The extent of this interpretation of the public trust is not
at all clear. Its application to wetlands protection would be
dependent on interpretations of at least two key terms. First,
what is meant in "interfering with use" 114 of state owned wa-

112.
The state of Montana applies the federal "log floating test." This test declares a body of water navigable if logs have been floated on it sometime, even
before statehood, that body of water was navigable in fact. The body of water
would be considered navigable even if the logs could only be floated on the river
during part of the year. ld. at 166.
113.
Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 170 (Mont.
1984). Wyoming has a similar public trust protection for recreational uses of water:
Irrespective of the ownership of the bed or channel of waters, and irrespective of their navigability, the public has the right to use public waters of this State for floating usable craft and that use may not be interfered with or curtailed by any landowner. Is also the right of the public
while so lawfully floating the state's waters to lawfully hunt or fish or do
any and all other things which are not otherwise made unlawful.
Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 147 (Wyo, 1961).
114.
Montana Coalition, 682 P.2d at 170. It is clear that the court has limited
its holding to interference with the use of waters protected by the trust, and not
with access to them. "We grant a cautionary note that nothing in this opinion
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ters? Broadly defined, it could be interpreted to include draining or denying water to a wetland area making it unusable for
recreational purposes. Under such a definition a vast amount
of wetlands could be protected without the necessity of finding
navigability. Narrowly interpreted, interference could be held
to extend no further than restricting physical presence on the
wetland. Under this definition, wetlands would be afforded
very little or no protection of their water resources.
Second, the application of this recreational trust depends
on the court's definition of recreation. It clearly applies to
hunting, fishing, boating and other traditional outdoor activities.115 The language of the opinion appears broad enough to
include birdwatching, hiking, plant collecting, photography and
other less traditional recreational activities. 116 It is possible
that wetlands involving too little water to allow for recreational
boating might not be protected by a recreational trust. 117 Depending on the definitions given to key terms by a state court,
the recreational trust that exists in some jurisdictions could
afford tremendous protection to wetlands.
There is another potential limit to this doctrine other than
the meaning of these key terms. The Supreme Court of Montana made it clear that the recreational trust extended only to
the waters "owned" by the state, and not to privately owned
waters. 118 Thus a wetland that might otherwise be protected
under the recreational trust would receive no protection at all
because it was a part of a private party's vested water rights.
Other courts have implied that the public trust might also
be extended to protect the wildlife dependent upon state waters.119 This application of the trust differs from the recreational trust in that the animals are the users as well as the
protected interest.

shall be construed as granting the public the right to enter upon or cross over
private property to reach the State owned waters . . . ." !d. at 172. See also supra
note 112.
!d. at 170.
115.
116.
!d.
117.
"The Consitution and the public trust doctrine do not permit a private
party to interfere with the public's right to recreational use of the surface of the
State's waters." !d.
The court's emphasis on the use of the surface of the water seems to imply a body
of water at least large enough for small craft use.
118.
!d.
119.
People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374 (Cal. 1897).
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In People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 120 the question was
raised whether the state had a cause of action against a lumber
mill that was polluting the Truckee river and killing off the
fish population. The California Supreme Court held that even
though the Truckee river was not navigable, and thus not subject to the public trust itself, the fish living in the river were
subject to the public trust as commonly owned property of the
citizens of the state. 121
The protection of the public trust over the fish extended
beyond their habitat in public waters. "To the extent that waters are the common passageway for fish, although flowing over
lands entirely subject to private ownership, they are deemed
for such purposes public waters, and subject to all laws of the
state regulating the right of fishery." 122 The court held that
the state did indeed have the power to enjoin the pollution of
the river.
The literal reading of this ruling would extend the protection of the public trust to wetlands serving as habitat for animals and wildlife. This would at least restrict actual physical
damage to the wetland in question and could also be extended
to restrict water allocations that harm wetlands.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Just v. Marinette County, 123 extended the trust to actually protect shoreline
wetlands regardless of their ownership. They made no specific
mention of navigability as a requirement and seemed to imply
that the wetlands deserved public trust protection for their own
sake. 124
Both of these decisions appear to apply to the protection of
wetlands. The greatest possible limits on their application are
the willingness of the state courts to extend the trust to protection of wildlife regardless of navigability.
In Marks v. Whitney/ 25 the California Supreme Court alluded to a potentially broad application of the public trust doctrine to wildlife and ecological interests. Though dealing with
tidelands that they had previously found to fall under the defi-

120.
ld.
121.
ld. at 374.
122.
ld. at 375.
123.
201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
ld. at 766. The Court made no specific mention of navigability, but the
124.
decision could be at least partially explained on the connection of the wetlands to
a large navigable lake. See McCurdy, supra note 47.
125.
491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971).
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nition of navigability, they stated:
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most
important public uses of the tidelands - a use encompassed
within the tidelands trust - is the preservation of those
lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the
area. 126

This case is clearly limited in its application - tidelands
themselves are a protected use of the public trust when navigable - but it does express a growing concern with previously
ignored elements of our environment.
Judges hold a variety of tools under the public trust, and it
is foreseeable that they could extend the public trust protection
to wetlands.

V.

SUMMARY

The public trust doctrine has expanded considerably from
its initial interpretation of protecting the navigability of public
water ways. This expansion of the trust may well have taken
in the protection of wetlands.
The application of the public trust to the protection of
wetlands is subject to the definition and reach that individual
states have given to the doctrine. Depending on the jurisdiction in question, the trust might be invoked to protect the water resources upon which the wetlands are dependent, to protect the wildlife which are dependent on the wetlands for their
continued vitality, or in some circumstances, to protect the
wetlands for their own sake.
The possible application of the trust to wetlands has inherent weaknesses. It is in no way a panacea for the ills of our
Nation's wetlands. It may, however, in some situations, be
invoked to protect a given wetland area, an area that might
otherwise be endangered under the current statutory
protections.

Michael L. Wolz

126.

Id. at 380.

